Your last sentence seems to exonerate senior military from this mess. I convinced a big part of the problem is mediocre air marshals admirals and generals
Ouch. That is quite a blistering little analysis - I felt the impact of some of it from 8000 km. One of the many things that is not clear to me is where the money for the DSRB will come from? If national defense budgets are not big enough on their own, how can the various nations find additional funds for the loan pool?
In essence, the member nation states pool their resources to provide the initial inject of funding and then work in partnership with private lending institutions. As it is collaborative and is highly credit-worthy, you get more bang for your buck than you would going alone.
Obviously requires nation-states to see this as a long-term investment for cheaper future gains, which is beyond the skill set of the UK Treasury.
Understood and I really hope it works. Canada for one has big plans, but I don’t know where they will find the funds or manpower for 12 subs they plan to buy from KNDS just for starters.
I’m assuming a lot of the increased nuclear expenditure is related to AUKUS? Is there any wisdom to the argument that we should switch to a conventional submarine fleet instead after Astute?
I would imagine that, proportionately, "People and Veterans" spending has grown exponentially over the last ~30+ years--since the end of the Cold War at least. As the UK does not have a dedicated veterans agency (correct me if I'm wrong), some of this spending is going to come from the MoD and thus can be used as a slight of hand to cover for core spending... but who would do that?
Even if Whitehall leaders were being perfectly above-board, personnel costs -- whether define broadly or tightly -- have skyrocketed in all Western militaries for reasons both inevitable and... not so inevitable. There are assumptions about salaries, facilities, families, and more that have gone unquestioned for decades--essentially that in order to "compete" with the civilian job market, Western militaries have to be civilian-like to the max extent possible without sacrificing combat effectiveness. I'm exaggerating by only a little, I'd say . . . I certainly don't want the Russian model of "People and Veterans" but it's also true that the British military of the Falklands War era or the US forces circa Desert Storm seemed to do okay . . . At the end of the day young men (and they're still the bulk of any force, of course) join the military precisely because it is *not* the civilian world. Yes, as volunteers they can't be told to shut their mouths and eat shit sandwiches as their WWII forefathers were (think about the logistics of that!)... but the US military rebounded from its post-draft/post-Vietnam woes relatively quickly by emphasizing (among other things) what one could do with their skills & benefits *after* they left the service. In other words, a serviceman's life was not expected to be cushy, but it could be made to be worth it. I fear we -- US, UK, Canada, probably most of Europe -- have focused a bit too much on making the front-end as attractive as possible, which means as expensive as possible. Just a theory, as they say.
So, in the UK the issue is not recruitment but retention. Keeping troops in the force is far more difficult than attracting them, especially when today they have far more information available on what their skillset can do for them outside service.
The renumeration and pensions for British servicepeople is actually worse than it was 15/20 years ago, believe it or not.
So, if you consider that the vast sums spent on Nuclear are primarily for submarines, you could argue that it + Maritime makes naval spending predominant.
Fair point. But I think a conventional fleet is what matters for our strategic reality. Keeping straits open and ensure global shipping lanes remain safe.
Your last sentence seems to exonerate senior military from this mess. I convinced a big part of the problem is mediocre air marshals admirals and generals
They are certainly part of the problem.
Ouch. That is quite a blistering little analysis - I felt the impact of some of it from 8000 km. One of the many things that is not clear to me is where the money for the DSRB will come from? If national defense budgets are not big enough on their own, how can the various nations find additional funds for the loan pool?
In essence, the member nation states pool their resources to provide the initial inject of funding and then work in partnership with private lending institutions. As it is collaborative and is highly credit-worthy, you get more bang for your buck than you would going alone.
Obviously requires nation-states to see this as a long-term investment for cheaper future gains, which is beyond the skill set of the UK Treasury.
Understood and I really hope it works. Canada for one has big plans, but I don’t know where they will find the funds or manpower for 12 subs they plan to buy from KNDS just for starters.
I’m assuming a lot of the increased nuclear expenditure is related to AUKUS? Is there any wisdom to the argument that we should switch to a conventional submarine fleet instead after Astute?
Great q. I’m broadly open to the idea of a mixed nuclear/non-nuclear attack submarine fleet.
"It is both embarrassing and dangerous. British military personnel, the British public, and our allies all deserve better." = Amen to that 🙁.
Buffoonery of the highest order
I would imagine that, proportionately, "People and Veterans" spending has grown exponentially over the last ~30+ years--since the end of the Cold War at least. As the UK does not have a dedicated veterans agency (correct me if I'm wrong), some of this spending is going to come from the MoD and thus can be used as a slight of hand to cover for core spending... but who would do that?
Even if Whitehall leaders were being perfectly above-board, personnel costs -- whether define broadly or tightly -- have skyrocketed in all Western militaries for reasons both inevitable and... not so inevitable. There are assumptions about salaries, facilities, families, and more that have gone unquestioned for decades--essentially that in order to "compete" with the civilian job market, Western militaries have to be civilian-like to the max extent possible without sacrificing combat effectiveness. I'm exaggerating by only a little, I'd say . . . I certainly don't want the Russian model of "People and Veterans" but it's also true that the British military of the Falklands War era or the US forces circa Desert Storm seemed to do okay . . . At the end of the day young men (and they're still the bulk of any force, of course) join the military precisely because it is *not* the civilian world. Yes, as volunteers they can't be told to shut their mouths and eat shit sandwiches as their WWII forefathers were (think about the logistics of that!)... but the US military rebounded from its post-draft/post-Vietnam woes relatively quickly by emphasizing (among other things) what one could do with their skills & benefits *after* they left the service. In other words, a serviceman's life was not expected to be cushy, but it could be made to be worth it. I fear we -- US, UK, Canada, probably most of Europe -- have focused a bit too much on making the front-end as attractive as possible, which means as expensive as possible. Just a theory, as they say.
So, in the UK the issue is not recruitment but retention. Keeping troops in the force is far more difficult than attracting them, especially when today they have far more information available on what their skillset can do for them outside service.
The renumeration and pensions for British servicepeople is actually worse than it was 15/20 years ago, believe it or not.
"Domain and Sub-section",FY26/27 – FY29/30
"People and Veterans",£78.5bn
"Defence Nuclear Enterprise (excluding workforce)",£63.6bn
"Air",£27.8bn
"Defence Infrastructure and Estate",£22.7bn
"Land",£19.2bn
"Maritime",£18.0bn
"Weapons and Munitions",£11.1bn
"The Digital Backbone and the Targeting Web",£7.5bn
"Science, Innovation and Technology",£4.3bn
"Space",£3.2bn
"Joint Support Enablement and Defence Medical Services",£2.9bn
"Cyber and EM",£2.5bn
"Defence Industry and Procurement",£0.5bn
What depresses me the most is that we are still investing in Land more than Maritime!? We are completely unmoored from our strategic reality
So, if you consider that the vast sums spent on Nuclear are primarily for submarines, you could argue that it + Maritime makes naval spending predominant.
Still odd though.
Fair point. But I think a conventional fleet is what matters for our strategic reality. Keeping straits open and ensure global shipping lanes remain safe.