Great fun! Two points - I would argue for a Western border that makes more use of the River Thames as a natural barrier Staines to Reading, and I would definitely incorporate Windsor into London as it has basic fortifications, a well armed militia (Eton) and would be be a buffer zone, to protect Heathrow. Secondly, how did you actually learn of our secession plans? I'm worried there has been a security breach .......
Hello, since this is a huge what-if? I'm wondering, being English and not a Londoner, why would I need to attack a well-fortified city and subject my forces to a battle of attrition if I can achieve the same goal by cutting off London's water and power, ensuring those supply lines cease to exist, or by destroying wherever it is in London's allied territory while keeping it surrounded? (I assume London must have secured a very strong alliance with its water and power sources.) As you're probably suspecting, I'm not English, I don't know London, I don't know where its power and water sources are, but like any large city, the vast majority must not be within its boundaries, and I don't know if they are within the seceded New London. And if they are within London's boundaries, I would make sure to destroy them and then wait for famine to do the rest.
(All of this was written in Spanish and translated by Google Translate. I hope it makes sense.)
Hola! Indeed, cutting off water and power would certainly be part of the English strategy if they were willing to ignore the laws of war (doing so entirely is considered a war crime). London does actually have a surprisingly decent level of power and water infrastrucure within its own borders, but obviously its priority would be to bolster this to ensure that it is relatively self-sufficient with rationing. This is also why keeping access open to the Thames Estuary is so critical - this is how supplies will get to London from the outside.
Okay, so as an Englishman who wants to end New London as an independent state, a A2AD strategy on the Thames Estuary and Heathrow and all other land, sea, and air access to New London would suffice. If I were a New Londoner, I would take advantage of any excuse to allow Procom and Retcom to gain strategic depth and secure access to those resources that would guarantee the state's survival.
It's against the rules of war, but ultimately, it's still a war that isn't a civilized act, and when it comes to political survival, the rules are diluted by the very need for survival. But in a more civilized setting, with rules that prevent the suffering of non-combatants, there's no way to make an omelet without breaking some eggs (there's no way to conquer a city without non-combatants dying).
Thanks for the intellectual exercise. I was 15 years old when the Falklands War happened (I won't object to the translator), and at the time, I thought Britain's strategy would be a powerful A2AD on the islands, blocking supply flights and ships, and hoping the Argentinians would surrender from starvation. But I never took the civilian population into account. Thanks for the lesson.
As a fellow alternate history and force structure nerd, I approve of this effort!
Coming from a Pacific Northwest context, the idea of trying to build a defence for a single urban area is pretty mind-boggling. The idea of Singapore is hard to fathom.
Our local independence "movement" (I use the term VERY loosely) Cascadia has whole mountain ranges between us and the America First types that would come for us in a USA breakup scenario because they're obsessed with lines on maps and don't know that had history gone slightly differently, the Oregon Country might still be part of the Commonwealth.
Honestly, if I'm trying to defend London I'm probably relying on lots and lots of drone teams. Probably only loose coordination between areas, but all working towards a common goal: literally everything military in a 20km circle around the perimeter gets hit. City itself is a walled off dystopian hellscape covered with cameras - oh wait, half of that is true already, innit? ;)
You're never winning a mechanised or personnel-based attrition fight. And retaliation doesn't deter if the enemy is motivated enough. If your force structure is too centralized when the enemy's shooters are always just a minute or two away from hitting any target they spot, the enemy can use any moment of command paralysis to seize a chunk inside the perimeter.
10 million educated people with global connections ought to be able to field thousands of drone operators more effectively than a theoretical England depending on traditional doctrine. Gotta make it too costly in raw military terms to dare poking the beehive.
Hiya! My assumption on this was a near-future scenario where UAVs and UGVs are fairly well integrated and established in military force structure, so yes, expect a good helping of drones throughout the force.
Retaliation is also about being able to effectively dismantle the enemy's capabilities - see Israel's recent campaign against Iran as a particularly successful example - and well as gaining strategic leverage for conflict termination. Singapore heavily emphasises this, hence why for a tiny urbanised island they have a strong air force and armoured brigades.
Sure, but Singapore has the whole being a natural fortress as a serious advantage. It can hope to (hope to - sure didn't against the Japanese, but there were reasons) hold out indefinitely so long as an amphibious or airborne incursion doesn't get a solid foothold. And even then, sustaining the logistics of the incursion, yikes.
London is vulnerable to Gaza-style direct incursions that segment the place into chunks. And the English can come from every direction, so strikes are bound to get through. Hence the requirement for a highly disaggregated force structure. Part of the purpose is political: if you damage what central structure exists, you risk some groups going completely rogue with their portion of the arsenal. In an operational sense, the enemy's decentralization creates endless troubles, especially with the checklist thinking that dominates too much (American, at least) planning.
Also, I know that it's in vogue to pretend that Israel scored massive, unprecedented, astonishing wins over everyone, but note what the IDF is having to do in Gaza with hostages still held by Hamas. And at best, half of Iran's strategic weapons were taken out. Neither conflict has terminated, so it seems premature to put too much stock in being able to simply retaliate (my criticism of the new rush to buy a few Tomahawks a bunch of countries have started). We westerners always declaring victory according to our own standards. I remember how that turned out in 2001 (Afghanistan) and 2003 (Iraq). There's always another round.
Indeed, which is how I imagined the Borough Defence Forces. Localised light units adapted for defence of their boroughs with high levels of independence from central authority. Not too dissimilar from similar such reserve forces found in the Baltics.
On retaliation - its a necessary part of any defensive (and deterrent!) strategy. I dont pretend that it is sufficient (as the UK is discovering re. its nuclear arsenal). This is particularly so for the scenario I've ginned up here, as London's critical strategic weakness is its reliance on a single access point to the sea.
I don't disagree so much as feel that most discussions about retaliation and deterrence are too... thin, I suppose. There's a baked-in assumption about the enemy's pain tolerance being similar to our own, so that if we can only inflict enough hurt in the right categories that will somehow translate into conflict termination.
This logic is causes wars that never actually do end - there's always another round ahead. Risks losing sight of operational achievements that can reshape the landscape and actually force the enemy to negotiate.
I guess my core suggestion is integrating the retaliatory and borough sides completely. Everything about the force posture must support London's case that if fighting breaks out at all, the nature of the London Forces makes inevitable retaliation so disruptive and extensive in a few key domains that ongoing hostilites aren't physically possible to sustain.
We're not talking about a missile raid every other night, but intensive, constant, unrelenting, yet in many ways chaotic and unpredictable pressure.
I think that's fair, though I also think that the force structure I outline broadly fits the requirements, with enough defensive mass and offensive punch working to a unified aim.
Fundamentally, its a made-up scenario so quite hard to go into too much depth, especially as I don't particularly outline the structure of the English polity or its forces! (perhaps a thought for a later article....) A point I should have made in the article is that, of course, you structure your forces to meet your most likely enemy.
This is crying out for a wargame!
That's a great idea - would be so much fun!
Seconded! This would be a great game 🙂👍
Great fun! Two points - I would argue for a Western border that makes more use of the River Thames as a natural barrier Staines to Reading, and I would definitely incorporate Windsor into London as it has basic fortifications, a well armed militia (Eton) and would be be a buffer zone, to protect Heathrow. Secondly, how did you actually learn of our secession plans? I'm worried there has been a security breach .......
😉
If you're into defence-based alternate history, you may also be interested in my imaginings of the Scottish Armed Forces in 2024, 10 years after that country voted for independence: https://pontifex.substack.com/p/scottish-defence-policy-61-if-wed
Thanks, I'll give it a gander!
Hello, since this is a huge what-if? I'm wondering, being English and not a Londoner, why would I need to attack a well-fortified city and subject my forces to a battle of attrition if I can achieve the same goal by cutting off London's water and power, ensuring those supply lines cease to exist, or by destroying wherever it is in London's allied territory while keeping it surrounded? (I assume London must have secured a very strong alliance with its water and power sources.) As you're probably suspecting, I'm not English, I don't know London, I don't know where its power and water sources are, but like any large city, the vast majority must not be within its boundaries, and I don't know if they are within the seceded New London. And if they are within London's boundaries, I would make sure to destroy them and then wait for famine to do the rest.
(All of this was written in Spanish and translated by Google Translate. I hope it makes sense.)
Hola! Indeed, cutting off water and power would certainly be part of the English strategy if they were willing to ignore the laws of war (doing so entirely is considered a war crime). London does actually have a surprisingly decent level of power and water infrastrucure within its own borders, but obviously its priority would be to bolster this to ensure that it is relatively self-sufficient with rationing. This is also why keeping access open to the Thames Estuary is so critical - this is how supplies will get to London from the outside.
Okay, so as an Englishman who wants to end New London as an independent state, a A2AD strategy on the Thames Estuary and Heathrow and all other land, sea, and air access to New London would suffice. If I were a New Londoner, I would take advantage of any excuse to allow Procom and Retcom to gain strategic depth and secure access to those resources that would guarantee the state's survival.
It's against the rules of war, but ultimately, it's still a war that isn't a civilized act, and when it comes to political survival, the rules are diluted by the very need for survival. But in a more civilized setting, with rules that prevent the suffering of non-combatants, there's no way to make an omelet without breaking some eggs (there's no way to conquer a city without non-combatants dying).
Thanks for the intellectual exercise. I was 15 years old when the Falklands War happened (I won't object to the translator), and at the time, I thought Britain's strategy would be a powerful A2AD on the islands, blocking supply flights and ships, and hoping the Argentinians would surrender from starvation. But I never took the civilian population into account. Thanks for the lesson.
As a fellow alternate history and force structure nerd, I approve of this effort!
Coming from a Pacific Northwest context, the idea of trying to build a defence for a single urban area is pretty mind-boggling. The idea of Singapore is hard to fathom.
Our local independence "movement" (I use the term VERY loosely) Cascadia has whole mountain ranges between us and the America First types that would come for us in a USA breakup scenario because they're obsessed with lines on maps and don't know that had history gone slightly differently, the Oregon Country might still be part of the Commonwealth.
Honestly, if I'm trying to defend London I'm probably relying on lots and lots of drone teams. Probably only loose coordination between areas, but all working towards a common goal: literally everything military in a 20km circle around the perimeter gets hit. City itself is a walled off dystopian hellscape covered with cameras - oh wait, half of that is true already, innit? ;)
You're never winning a mechanised or personnel-based attrition fight. And retaliation doesn't deter if the enemy is motivated enough. If your force structure is too centralized when the enemy's shooters are always just a minute or two away from hitting any target they spot, the enemy can use any moment of command paralysis to seize a chunk inside the perimeter.
10 million educated people with global connections ought to be able to field thousands of drone operators more effectively than a theoretical England depending on traditional doctrine. Gotta make it too costly in raw military terms to dare poking the beehive.
Hiya! My assumption on this was a near-future scenario where UAVs and UGVs are fairly well integrated and established in military force structure, so yes, expect a good helping of drones throughout the force.
Retaliation is also about being able to effectively dismantle the enemy's capabilities - see Israel's recent campaign against Iran as a particularly successful example - and well as gaining strategic leverage for conflict termination. Singapore heavily emphasises this, hence why for a tiny urbanised island they have a strong air force and armoured brigades.
Sure, but Singapore has the whole being a natural fortress as a serious advantage. It can hope to (hope to - sure didn't against the Japanese, but there were reasons) hold out indefinitely so long as an amphibious or airborne incursion doesn't get a solid foothold. And even then, sustaining the logistics of the incursion, yikes.
London is vulnerable to Gaza-style direct incursions that segment the place into chunks. And the English can come from every direction, so strikes are bound to get through. Hence the requirement for a highly disaggregated force structure. Part of the purpose is political: if you damage what central structure exists, you risk some groups going completely rogue with their portion of the arsenal. In an operational sense, the enemy's decentralization creates endless troubles, especially with the checklist thinking that dominates too much (American, at least) planning.
Also, I know that it's in vogue to pretend that Israel scored massive, unprecedented, astonishing wins over everyone, but note what the IDF is having to do in Gaza with hostages still held by Hamas. And at best, half of Iran's strategic weapons were taken out. Neither conflict has terminated, so it seems premature to put too much stock in being able to simply retaliate (my criticism of the new rush to buy a few Tomahawks a bunch of countries have started). We westerners always declaring victory according to our own standards. I remember how that turned out in 2001 (Afghanistan) and 2003 (Iraq). There's always another round.
Indeed, which is how I imagined the Borough Defence Forces. Localised light units adapted for defence of their boroughs with high levels of independence from central authority. Not too dissimilar from similar such reserve forces found in the Baltics.
On retaliation - its a necessary part of any defensive (and deterrent!) strategy. I dont pretend that it is sufficient (as the UK is discovering re. its nuclear arsenal). This is particularly so for the scenario I've ginned up here, as London's critical strategic weakness is its reliance on a single access point to the sea.
I don't disagree so much as feel that most discussions about retaliation and deterrence are too... thin, I suppose. There's a baked-in assumption about the enemy's pain tolerance being similar to our own, so that if we can only inflict enough hurt in the right categories that will somehow translate into conflict termination.
This logic is causes wars that never actually do end - there's always another round ahead. Risks losing sight of operational achievements that can reshape the landscape and actually force the enemy to negotiate.
I guess my core suggestion is integrating the retaliatory and borough sides completely. Everything about the force posture must support London's case that if fighting breaks out at all, the nature of the London Forces makes inevitable retaliation so disruptive and extensive in a few key domains that ongoing hostilites aren't physically possible to sustain.
We're not talking about a missile raid every other night, but intensive, constant, unrelenting, yet in many ways chaotic and unpredictable pressure.
I think that's fair, though I also think that the force structure I outline broadly fits the requirements, with enough defensive mass and offensive punch working to a unified aim.
Fundamentally, its a made-up scenario so quite hard to go into too much depth, especially as I don't particularly outline the structure of the English polity or its forces! (perhaps a thought for a later article....) A point I should have made in the article is that, of course, you structure your forces to meet your most likely enemy.