Excellent article. It mirrors questions I’ve asked, especially, “So what will you lose?” Whenever there is a new capability that’s the question no one seems to think of asking. Its as if take an ancient warrior and start them out with a spear and shield…and a sword…and a bow…and a cross bow…and more armor…wait lets mount some on horses…Hey elephants are kinda cool…You can’t have it all. Most of my natsec guys are saying, “Drones need to be organic to the squad level…” Okay so are you adding a man? Are you losing what? Low EM signature? Manpad? I’m also not all agog of the “infinite power of drones”… I had someone pitching that to me after the Azer-Armenian “warlet.” “Armor is dead…” No…You just need more quad 50s…Rheinmetall was already experimenting with what is basically a AA form of shotgun shell for “mass drone” attacks. The Ukrainians wanted more 50 cal or similar MGs for exactly that purpose. There is usually a lower tech and simpler way to take out that expensive piece of equipment (e.g. jamming…even trained raptors…) Not always…but often a good think will find something in inventory that can address the problem… Before going “all in” on the next Johnny Whizbang technology its always a good idea to ask questions like, “What’s our strategy and what will this accomplish?”…Otherwise you waste 20 years developing something like the Littoral Combat Ship to solve a problem you never had, with a technology that creates more problems than it solves…
Appreciate the often-underestimated manpower and force structure trade-offs that come with scaling uncrewed systems. It's a critical consideration for any military serious about drone adoption. This makes me think about how peer competitors are approaching these human capital and organizational design challenges. For instance, the PLA's pursuit of 'intelligentized warfare' must also involve significant shifts in personnel skill sets and unit structures to effectively operate and support China's growing array of uncrewed and autonomous systems, all underpinned by their evolving C4ISR. https://ordersandobservations.substack.com/
Great points, Matthew. In recent years, the U.S. Marine Corps has decided to divest (a hotly contested topic) all tanks, a large percentage of tubed artillery, MP Battalions, and certain aviation assets to reorganize and acquire new capabilities.
It’s not all about drones, but it includes drones and a host of new capabilities and strategic focus.
Your comments about countermeasures are also right on, I believe. In recent years, at defense expos, I have seen vendors showcase an ever-larger inventory of counter-drone systems. It’s just a matter of time before the countermeasures catch up and forces like the Marine Corps look back at their tank divestment with regret.
Ok: I'll do a straight 1 for 1 swap with the mortar section, because that's the natural place to swap in quadcopter drones. I'll trade a ground control station for each mortar tube and a drone for each shell.
The result is I'll lose a lot of weight, gain more stowed kills, and gain a little bit of scouting ability.
Are you willing to give up continual organic indirect fire support and the ability to drop smoke and illumination? Or do you see all IDF being pushed back to higher echelons?
Drones *are* my continual organic IDF. The scouting, precision, & hitting mobile targets is icing on the cake.
I'm happy losing illum & smoke at coy/BN; because 1) there's insufficient weight capacity in a BCL to have adequate smoke & adequate HE for a company atk. I'm already dropping them to have enough mortar HE. 2) they're worth much less today with NV, thermals, and enemy drones. 3) if we're pushing with preplanned smoke, we will be depending on 155s and smoke generators regardless.
Near term, I expect most armies will keep 120mm mortars and 155SPGs for area fires while drones replace 60mm and 81mm mortars. Long term, I believe drones for near and guided rockets for everything else.
You make a strong argument! I admit, I don't think drones are yet a valid replacement for mortars (lack of sustained fire would be my concern), but... the question is less that they are, but whether it is more useful for an infantry unit to have them in general compared to mortars if push comes to shove. On that, there is a strong positive argument.
Anecdotally, I do know of an inf unit that replaced their mortar platoon with strike drones, and then apparently regretted it. Caveats, but interesting in of itself.
At last a pragmatic view of drone warfare , the latest drone has trailing control wires ( against jamming) this actually causes logistical problems and operators nearer the front line. The Russo Ukraine war is giving robotic and aerial drones a full testing, both in defence and Offensive.
A very good article Matthew, and I totally agree there is certainly a great deal of experimentation going on but the lessons need to considered carefully especially since the dust hasn't cleared yet. We need to keep watching, experimenting and thinking about how this tech will change the battlefield. And, I don't think we have a clear picture yet. Well done.
Subframe drones seem most like a replacement for mortars. Indirect fire and making up in accuracy what mortars deliver in volume. More effective against vehicles.
Larger drones might be a replacement for rocket artillery, but probably are just what close-air-support and logistics strikes looks like as the airspace gets too hot for manned aircraft.
The interesting thing about drones is they can find and kill vehicles reliably a few miles from the line of contact. The front lines might be logistics starved like never before, and can a system be backpacked, dirtbiked, or muled in might be the determining factor of whether it is effective in a drone swept battlespace.
Really great point about "mass" as counter-intuitive to the initial intent of the initial perspective of drones. It might not be until we develop "swarm" technology (which are already seen in the private sector) till we can multiply "mass" on the battlefield in relations to the ratio of operators and logistic chain of support to making this happen. This makes you rethink about the principles of war even further and which principle are we addressing by time or what are we strategizing as important to pursue. Offensive or Mass?
Excellent article. It mirrors questions I’ve asked, especially, “So what will you lose?” Whenever there is a new capability that’s the question no one seems to think of asking. Its as if take an ancient warrior and start them out with a spear and shield…and a sword…and a bow…and a cross bow…and more armor…wait lets mount some on horses…Hey elephants are kinda cool…You can’t have it all. Most of my natsec guys are saying, “Drones need to be organic to the squad level…” Okay so are you adding a man? Are you losing what? Low EM signature? Manpad? I’m also not all agog of the “infinite power of drones”… I had someone pitching that to me after the Azer-Armenian “warlet.” “Armor is dead…” No…You just need more quad 50s…Rheinmetall was already experimenting with what is basically a AA form of shotgun shell for “mass drone” attacks. The Ukrainians wanted more 50 cal or similar MGs for exactly that purpose. There is usually a lower tech and simpler way to take out that expensive piece of equipment (e.g. jamming…even trained raptors…) Not always…but often a good think will find something in inventory that can address the problem… Before going “all in” on the next Johnny Whizbang technology its always a good idea to ask questions like, “What’s our strategy and what will this accomplish?”…Otherwise you waste 20 years developing something like the Littoral Combat Ship to solve a problem you never had, with a technology that creates more problems than it solves…
Appreciate the often-underestimated manpower and force structure trade-offs that come with scaling uncrewed systems. It's a critical consideration for any military serious about drone adoption. This makes me think about how peer competitors are approaching these human capital and organizational design challenges. For instance, the PLA's pursuit of 'intelligentized warfare' must also involve significant shifts in personnel skill sets and unit structures to effectively operate and support China's growing array of uncrewed and autonomous systems, all underpinned by their evolving C4ISR. https://ordersandobservations.substack.com/
Great points, Matthew. In recent years, the U.S. Marine Corps has decided to divest (a hotly contested topic) all tanks, a large percentage of tubed artillery, MP Battalions, and certain aviation assets to reorganize and acquire new capabilities.
It’s not all about drones, but it includes drones and a host of new capabilities and strategic focus.
Your comments about countermeasures are also right on, I believe. In recent years, at defense expos, I have seen vendors showcase an ever-larger inventory of counter-drone systems. It’s just a matter of time before the countermeasures catch up and forces like the Marine Corps look back at their tank divestment with regret.
>So what will you lose?
Ok: I'll do a straight 1 for 1 swap with the mortar section, because that's the natural place to swap in quadcopter drones. I'll trade a ground control station for each mortar tube and a drone for each shell.
The result is I'll lose a lot of weight, gain more stowed kills, and gain a little bit of scouting ability.
Are you willing to give up continual organic indirect fire support and the ability to drop smoke and illumination? Or do you see all IDF being pushed back to higher echelons?
Drones *are* my continual organic IDF. The scouting, precision, & hitting mobile targets is icing on the cake.
I'm happy losing illum & smoke at coy/BN; because 1) there's insufficient weight capacity in a BCL to have adequate smoke & adequate HE for a company atk. I'm already dropping them to have enough mortar HE. 2) they're worth much less today with NV, thermals, and enemy drones. 3) if we're pushing with preplanned smoke, we will be depending on 155s and smoke generators regardless.
Near term, I expect most armies will keep 120mm mortars and 155SPGs for area fires while drones replace 60mm and 81mm mortars. Long term, I believe drones for near and guided rockets for everything else.
You make a strong argument! I admit, I don't think drones are yet a valid replacement for mortars (lack of sustained fire would be my concern), but... the question is less that they are, but whether it is more useful for an infantry unit to have them in general compared to mortars if push comes to shove. On that, there is a strong positive argument.
Anecdotally, I do know of an inf unit that replaced their mortar platoon with strike drones, and then apparently regretted it. Caveats, but interesting in of itself.
At last a pragmatic view of drone warfare , the latest drone has trailing control wires ( against jamming) this actually causes logistical problems and operators nearer the front line. The Russo Ukraine war is giving robotic and aerial drones a full testing, both in defence and Offensive.
A very good article Matthew, and I totally agree there is certainly a great deal of experimentation going on but the lessons need to considered carefully especially since the dust hasn't cleared yet. We need to keep watching, experimenting and thinking about how this tech will change the battlefield. And, I don't think we have a clear picture yet. Well done.
Very interesting, thanks.
Subframe drones seem most like a replacement for mortars. Indirect fire and making up in accuracy what mortars deliver in volume. More effective against vehicles.
Larger drones might be a replacement for rocket artillery, but probably are just what close-air-support and logistics strikes looks like as the airspace gets too hot for manned aircraft.
The interesting thing about drones is they can find and kill vehicles reliably a few miles from the line of contact. The front lines might be logistics starved like never before, and can a system be backpacked, dirtbiked, or muled in might be the determining factor of whether it is effective in a drone swept battlespace.
Really great point about "mass" as counter-intuitive to the initial intent of the initial perspective of drones. It might not be until we develop "swarm" technology (which are already seen in the private sector) till we can multiply "mass" on the battlefield in relations to the ratio of operators and logistic chain of support to making this happen. This makes you rethink about the principles of war even further and which principle are we addressing by time or what are we strategizing as important to pursue. Offensive or Mass?