I understand the feelings but rather than rage or despair I think the best thing to do is keep writing good informative articles that stimulate public discussion.
Yes, we had much regrets in Norway about WW2 that we did not seriously build up in 1930s. Analysis here tends to stress that we very well could have beaten back a German invasion had we invested more seriously in our defense when we saw what was happening on the continent.
Likewise there is urgency in re-armament now, and anyway that could be good for jobs. The urgency suggest it is worth borrowing money to surge the defense industry at this point.
And learning from Ukraine suggests we need broad preparation. Power plants must get secured. We ought to get more roof-top solar to have some power in case central power plants gets knocked out.
Bombing shelters need upgrades.
We must learn from Ukraine about distributed drone production. This is in a way a civilian skill. Learning how to use 3D printers and assemble drones should become part of school curriculum, or we need workshops and other things to spread the knowledge.
Ukraine is keeping their whole defense going in large part because of thousands of civilians in makeshift workshops assembling drones. They make millions of drones this way and they carry out 70-80 percent of battlefield casualties. This is not from traditional factories. This from the people.
But why would the modern populace do that? A decent chunk care more about Palestinians, or whatever. The modern neoliberal system relies on mass apathy just like every other dictatorship around the clock. I’d say welfare nationalism will have to be reintroduced
This is a great piece, Matthew. Your linking of the supposed unrealism of the ‘Wargame’ scenario with the world we live in now is bang on. A fundamental psychosocial shift is called for among people raised in movies in which the good guys have always been good. Those of us who risked our lives alongside Americans find the rupture especially poignant but *at least we have internalised it*.
In fairness to the authors of the Strategic Defence Review (not that you’ve quibbled with their work, just pointing to others thinking the same way), they sought to make the point about a ‘national conversation’ about the likelihood of war, and to increase defence spending accordingly.
That warning (and similar from the Defence select committees) has not landed. It really does feel like we are at least two years past our “1937 moment”. So I couldn’t agree more with the way you’ve expressed the need for a sense of urgency.
Totally agree. And I would argue the exact same issues plague your antipodean cousins (and AUKUS partners) in Australia and our government’s pedestrian and underwhelming thinking on defence.
Absolutely on point. The theme around weening ourselves off of US kit is spot on. Fantastic European suppliers can and should absolutely satisfy the demand.
As for the U.K. government - I worry for the Defence Investment Plan. Neither timely, nor I expect helpful when it comes.
The self imposed strategic paralysis is unfortunately also very strong here on the continent, replace the UK with Germany in your post and it would accurately describe Germany's situation as well. We might have dug ourselfs an even deeper hole than the UK as we must rely on US extended deterrence whereas the UK might still fall back to its nuclear deterrent if push really comes to shove (for as long as the US still supports and supplies the UK deterrent politically, technologically and operationally).
I understand the logic of your argument, and I agree that the UK cannot assume the post-1945 security arrangement will persist indefinitely. That said, “sovereignty begins at home,” and this is where the UK’s deepest vulnerability lies.
The UK currently has a governing class that struggles to articulate a coherent national interest, national sovereignty, or even parliamentary supremacy over globalized institutions. There is no domestically agreed definition of citizenship or political belonging. That internal incoherence is a far greater threat to UK national security than fluctuations in the transatlantic relationship.
There is also a deep irony here: a UK that had clearly re-asserted its own national interests would likely find the United States easier, not harder, to deal with. The current US right does not bear the UK particular ill will. Their position is more prosaic: when they compare the size of the Russian economy to Europe’s, and then compare their own economy to China’s, they conclude—reasonably—that Europe should be able to handle Russia while the US focuses on the larger strategic challenge.
In 1945, Europe, Russia, and China were devastated. That is no longer true. What they resent is the expectation that the exact bargain of 1945 must persist unchanged.
If there is ill will in the relationship, it has accumulated over decades—particularly among British elites who expressed cultural contempt for Americans while remaining comfortably under the US security umbrella. Whatever people choose to say publicly, this pattern has been visible for a long time.
One important exception has been military-to-military relations. From NCOs through general officers, UK–US military relations have historically been marked by genuine mutual respect. This has been a cultural outlier relative to much of the broader British elite class.
None of this argues against strengthening domestic defence capacity and supply chains. That is prudent. But it should not slide into paranoia. The idea that the US would deliberately “switch off” critical systems and hand Europe to Russia is not a serious strategic assessment—it reflects projection rather than policy reality.
Greenland was shocking, but it was primarily an artefact of a narcissist leader in cognitive decline, not a broad policy preference from the American right / Republican Party. I understand why everyone was upset by it, but it was not a durable signal of future US foreign policy intent and to treat it as such would do more harm than good to UK interests.
"Finally, and most importantly, a sense of fucking urgency from the government wouldn’t go amiss."
Yes. My word yes 😬🤦🏻♂️😬🤦🏻♂️😬🤦🏻♂️😬
Wouldn’t it fucking just. I’ve spent the last month alternating between despair and rage.
Rage is better 👍😕.
I understand the feelings but rather than rage or despair I think the best thing to do is keep writing good informative articles that stimulate public discussion.
A very sound plan 👍
Yes, we had much regrets in Norway about WW2 that we did not seriously build up in 1930s. Analysis here tends to stress that we very well could have beaten back a German invasion had we invested more seriously in our defense when we saw what was happening on the continent.
Likewise there is urgency in re-armament now, and anyway that could be good for jobs. The urgency suggest it is worth borrowing money to surge the defense industry at this point.
And learning from Ukraine suggests we need broad preparation. Power plants must get secured. We ought to get more roof-top solar to have some power in case central power plants gets knocked out.
Bombing shelters need upgrades.
We must learn from Ukraine about distributed drone production. This is in a way a civilian skill. Learning how to use 3D printers and assemble drones should become part of school curriculum, or we need workshops and other things to spread the knowledge.
Ukraine is keeping their whole defense going in large part because of thousands of civilians in makeshift workshops assembling drones. They make millions of drones this way and they carry out 70-80 percent of battlefield casualties. This is not from traditional factories. This from the people.
We need this kind of full defense thinking.
But why would the modern populace do that? A decent chunk care more about Palestinians, or whatever. The modern neoliberal system relies on mass apathy just like every other dictatorship around the clock. I’d say welfare nationalism will have to be reintroduced
This is a great piece, Matthew. Your linking of the supposed unrealism of the ‘Wargame’ scenario with the world we live in now is bang on. A fundamental psychosocial shift is called for among people raised in movies in which the good guys have always been good. Those of us who risked our lives alongside Americans find the rupture especially poignant but *at least we have internalised it*.
In fairness to the authors of the Strategic Defence Review (not that you’ve quibbled with their work, just pointing to others thinking the same way), they sought to make the point about a ‘national conversation’ about the likelihood of war, and to increase defence spending accordingly.
That warning (and similar from the Defence select committees) has not landed. It really does feel like we are at least two years past our “1937 moment”. So I couldn’t agree more with the way you’ve expressed the need for a sense of urgency.
Thanks Constantin! Much appreciated. I hope the government might listen one day…
Totally agree. And I would argue the exact same issues plague your antipodean cousins (and AUKUS partners) in Australia and our government’s pedestrian and underwhelming thinking on defence.
Absolutely on point. The theme around weening ourselves off of US kit is spot on. Fantastic European suppliers can and should absolutely satisfy the demand.
As for the U.K. government - I worry for the Defence Investment Plan. Neither timely, nor I expect helpful when it comes.
The self imposed strategic paralysis is unfortunately also very strong here on the continent, replace the UK with Germany in your post and it would accurately describe Germany's situation as well. We might have dug ourselfs an even deeper hole than the UK as we must rely on US extended deterrence whereas the UK might still fall back to its nuclear deterrent if push really comes to shove (for as long as the US still supports and supplies the UK deterrent politically, technologically and operationally).
Brillant read
I understand the logic of your argument, and I agree that the UK cannot assume the post-1945 security arrangement will persist indefinitely. That said, “sovereignty begins at home,” and this is where the UK’s deepest vulnerability lies.
The UK currently has a governing class that struggles to articulate a coherent national interest, national sovereignty, or even parliamentary supremacy over globalized institutions. There is no domestically agreed definition of citizenship or political belonging. That internal incoherence is a far greater threat to UK national security than fluctuations in the transatlantic relationship.
There is also a deep irony here: a UK that had clearly re-asserted its own national interests would likely find the United States easier, not harder, to deal with. The current US right does not bear the UK particular ill will. Their position is more prosaic: when they compare the size of the Russian economy to Europe’s, and then compare their own economy to China’s, they conclude—reasonably—that Europe should be able to handle Russia while the US focuses on the larger strategic challenge.
In 1945, Europe, Russia, and China were devastated. That is no longer true. What they resent is the expectation that the exact bargain of 1945 must persist unchanged.
If there is ill will in the relationship, it has accumulated over decades—particularly among British elites who expressed cultural contempt for Americans while remaining comfortably under the US security umbrella. Whatever people choose to say publicly, this pattern has been visible for a long time.
One important exception has been military-to-military relations. From NCOs through general officers, UK–US military relations have historically been marked by genuine mutual respect. This has been a cultural outlier relative to much of the broader British elite class.
None of this argues against strengthening domestic defence capacity and supply chains. That is prudent. But it should not slide into paranoia. The idea that the US would deliberately “switch off” critical systems and hand Europe to Russia is not a serious strategic assessment—it reflects projection rather than policy reality.
Greenland was shocking, but it was primarily an artefact of a narcissist leader in cognitive decline, not a broad policy preference from the American right / Republican Party. I understand why everyone was upset by it, but it was not a durable signal of future US foreign policy intent and to treat it as such would do more harm than good to UK interests.
Preparation is wise. Panic is not.