Great piece. What's striking is how much cleaner their strategies are compared to the UK or US. No delusions of grandeur, just priorities grounded in geography, capability, and alliances.
Also worth watching: how both could become testbeds for dual-use tech adoption. Neither has the industrial inertia of a defense prime-heavy economy, which gives them more room to buy smart and integrate fast. That flexibility might turn out to be their biggest strength.
Good article Matthew. I undertook my Master’s thesis looking at Ireland’s self conception of neutrality particularly since the post-2022 Ukrainian conflict. The symbiotic relationship between neutrality and defence policy is starting to be slowly prized apart however it will be a long but necessary road for Irish policy makers. Overall NATO membership remains politically (and financially) unfeasible but Ireland is slowly appreciating the need for enhanced maritime and cyber protection as your article drew out.
Do you think the removal of the Triple Lock will occur soon, or is that still a politically difficult policy to enact? It would be an obvious first step in greater interoperability with EU-flagged forces, at least.
The government parties have committed to that and functionally they have enough support votes to carry the removal of the ‘triple lock’. It is probably not significant an enough an issue to trigger an internal mutiny from government TDs (compared to say MPs from Labour over benefit cuts). It would carry if put to Dáil Éireann.
As regards interoperability with EU forces that will be a much slower process to achieve. The sceptre of these European states being NATO members means even EU alignment is a hard sell in the short term particularly to opposition parties (Sinn Féin, People before Profit, Independent Group TDs) who are deeply suspicious of defence Co-operation with any states (fundamental to their interpretation of neutrality). Even if this engagement was conducted under a EU banner (a broadly popular institution amongst the Irish public) the shadow of NATO would be too much and too soon. Ireland has had extremely limited engagment with the EU’s PESCO initiative reflecting the government’s concerns over any multilateral cooperation. In the short to medium term removal of the triple lock is a more reasonable ambition but this will still be in support of UN Missions primarily than any EU Defence pact activities.
Exceedingly interesting article Matthew and a very detailed look at Ireland and New Zealand. It will be very interesting to see if both their defence aspirations come to fruition. I hope they do, as they sound sensible and required given the prevailing defense related situations world wide 👍
Small countries are interesting. If geographically important, at some level they know that they are an objective as much as an ally and so can skimp on defense if a great power needs the small power's territory. And if the threats are powerful but far away.
New Zealand can rely on Australia as a shield--and can make its forces complement Australia. And rely on Australia drawing in more allies.
Ireland can rely on Britain as a shield--and the wider NATO.
Territorial defense and possibly insurgency/irregular resistance until allied help can arrive would be a very different defense policy than Ireland's or New Zealand's.
Great piece. What's striking is how much cleaner their strategies are compared to the UK or US. No delusions of grandeur, just priorities grounded in geography, capability, and alliances.
Also worth watching: how both could become testbeds for dual-use tech adoption. Neither has the industrial inertia of a defense prime-heavy economy, which gives them more room to buy smart and integrate fast. That flexibility might turn out to be their biggest strength.
Thank you! Yes, it is very obvious, isn't it?
As I note, both Ireland and NZ have decent tech sectors which could come in handy for certain areas of defence.
Good article Matthew. I undertook my Master’s thesis looking at Ireland’s self conception of neutrality particularly since the post-2022 Ukrainian conflict. The symbiotic relationship between neutrality and defence policy is starting to be slowly prized apart however it will be a long but necessary road for Irish policy makers. Overall NATO membership remains politically (and financially) unfeasible but Ireland is slowly appreciating the need for enhanced maritime and cyber protection as your article drew out.
Thank you!
Do you think the removal of the Triple Lock will occur soon, or is that still a politically difficult policy to enact? It would be an obvious first step in greater interoperability with EU-flagged forces, at least.
The government parties have committed to that and functionally they have enough support votes to carry the removal of the ‘triple lock’. It is probably not significant an enough an issue to trigger an internal mutiny from government TDs (compared to say MPs from Labour over benefit cuts). It would carry if put to Dáil Éireann.
As regards interoperability with EU forces that will be a much slower process to achieve. The sceptre of these European states being NATO members means even EU alignment is a hard sell in the short term particularly to opposition parties (Sinn Féin, People before Profit, Independent Group TDs) who are deeply suspicious of defence Co-operation with any states (fundamental to their interpretation of neutrality). Even if this engagement was conducted under a EU banner (a broadly popular institution amongst the Irish public) the shadow of NATO would be too much and too soon. Ireland has had extremely limited engagment with the EU’s PESCO initiative reflecting the government’s concerns over any multilateral cooperation. In the short to medium term removal of the triple lock is a more reasonable ambition but this will still be in support of UN Missions primarily than any EU Defence pact activities.
Fascinating, thank you for the insight!
“In a world where the big fish eat small fish, and the small fish eat shrimps, Singapore must become a poisonous shrimp.” Lee Kwan Yew.
Exceedingly interesting article Matthew and a very detailed look at Ireland and New Zealand. It will be very interesting to see if both their defence aspirations come to fruition. I hope they do, as they sound sensible and required given the prevailing defense related situations world wide 👍
Small countries are interesting. If geographically important, at some level they know that they are an objective as much as an ally and so can skimp on defense if a great power needs the small power's territory. And if the threats are powerful but far away.
New Zealand can rely on Australia as a shield--and can make its forces complement Australia. And rely on Australia drawing in more allies.
Ireland can rely on Britain as a shield--and the wider NATO.
It would be interesting to see a deep dive on the Baltic States, especially Estonia--which has a defense horizon that could be as constricted as its border city of Narva. (Which I discussed here: https://lsc-pagepro.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/?i=837089&p=16&view=issueViewer).
Territorial defense and possibly insurgency/irregular resistance until allied help can arrive would be a very different defense policy than Ireland's or New Zealand's.
Anyway, interesting piece.