Iran-Israel and The Wargame
Parallels and lessons for the UK
The outbreak of full-blown war between Israel and Iran has captured the world’s attention. While both have been engaged in a shadow war for decades – and have traded blows in public before – nothing has been seen before on this scale.
At the same time, last week an excellent new podcast came out, published by Sky News and Tortoise Media. The Wargame records a real-life simulation played by former members of the British political and security establishment, focused around an attack by Russia on the UK. It is gripping listening and quite alarming, if depressingly familiar to anyone who has worked in British defence.
The confluence of a simulated attack, an actual major attack on a key adversary, and the ongoing experience of Ukraine and elsewhere, makes for some interesting parallels. Below are few key thoughts from me on the situation so far, especially as it relates to the UK. Caveats of course abound – we are in the very early stages of this war and all of us will be deluged with dis/mis/mal information, as truth is the forever the first casualty of war. Noting that, allons y!
Firstly, Surprise and Shock Action still matters. I’ve heard a lot of takes over the past two years suggesting that surprise and shock is impossible to achieve in our hyper-networked panopticon age. Well, Israel managed to achieve it a few days ago (as did Ukraine last year in Kursk). Similarly, The Wargame details the opening moves of a surprise attack on the UK by the Russian Federation, combining physical, cyber, and direct action/special forces activity to discombobulate the British state. This is a very real threat, especially considering that our adversaries do not necessarily think in the same way as us and likely have a different risk calculus. On the flipside - it does make you think what we might be able to do to an opponent if we were willing to accept the risk involved….
When discussing Intelligence, one must of course include a butchered Sun Tzu quote: ‘know your enemy and know yourself, and you need not fear the result of a hundred battles’. Israel’s incredible intelligence penetration of Iran is perhaps the most impressive feature of this war (it would be interesting, if impossible, to know how much was provided by US assets). Having both quantity and quality of intelligence collection and analysis is key to victory, as it ever was. While admittedly I wasn’t entirely convinced by the starting scenario of The Wargame, a key element is a UK intelligence failure to perceive and react to the threat before it was too late. It is worth being forever cognisant that our adversaries have a vote, and just because we live in the information age doesn’t mean that we can’t be deceived. Israel indeed found this out themselves, with tragic consequences, in 2023.
Classic Air Power can still be cripplingly powerful. Israel conducted a text-book initial air campaign, using a mix of special forces (yes, including drones), warplanes, and (I’m sure) other capabilities such as cyber to crush Iranian air defence. Overall, an excellent example of how to conduct what is known in military jargon as Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD). Many commentators, in my view hyper-fixated on Ukraine, have suggested that this form of operation was either impossible or too difficult in the modern age of integrated air defence; Israel has shown this to be untrue. That isn’t to say that it is easy – it isn’t – and frankly I’m not convinced, on evidence, of the competence of the Iranian Air Defence Force, but the idea that western air power advantages have been negated by changing trends in warfare appears decidedly inaccurate.
Quality Matters. Yes, quantity matters - but so does quality, especially at the tactical level. Israel, a small nation of 9m people, has managed to decidedly gain the upper hand against Iran, a large country of 90m people, mostly thanks to high-quality personnel, equipment, and processes. While it does not fully compensate for glaring deficiencies elsewhere (a huge problem for the UK), being good at fighting really does matter in war. We will see if Israel can sustain and exploit its victories, but so far the undoubted qualititive advantage of the Israeli military is reaping rewards.
The criticality of homeland defence. Iran retaliated against Israel with a huge barrage of rockets, drones and missiles, but most - if not all - of them have been intercepted by Israeli air defences. Israel, by comparison, appears to have almost complete superiority over Iranian skies, and has been able to assassinate many top commanders, smash Iranian infrastructure, and conduct significant cyber and information operations. One of the key lessons from The Wargame is the impoverished state of Britain’s homeland air defences – reduced to a few Typhoon fighters and missile defence destroyers (when they are operational), with limited ammunition stocks. Similarly, even without air defence, few of our critical sites are hardened and many, it seems, poorly guarded. If we ended up in a scenario which involved being fired upon by a mass of missiles, the result would probably look more like that of Iran than Israel. Not pretty.
Tactics vs Strategy. We have yet to see the end of this conflict, as of the time of writing. Honestly, I don’t see the long-running Iran-Israel confrontation ending any time soon, regardless of what happens. We then come to the classic question of tactics vs strategy. Israel has achieved incredible tactical and (depending on whether you like the term) operational successes so far – but will they translate into long-lasting strategic success? What is the long-term strategy? Is there a long-term strategy? If so, does this bombing campaign assist lead to a viable end-goal for reaching that strategy? One of the greatest difficulties faced by many militarily-powerful nations, especially in the modern era, is the translation of battlefield success to strategic victory.1 We will see if Israel is able to do so in this case.
The Political Calculation of War and Escalation. This is perhaps the most interesting part for me, and something that ties directly to The Wargame. Iran, despite being under heavy attack, has not gone full out on every option open to it. They have not, for example, decided to close the Straits of Hormuz. Similarly, their proxies have stayed mostly quiet, whether due to explicit orders or out of a sense of self-preservation. This includes the powerful Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq, who have been relatively unscathed after the last two years of conflict. Assuming this is all part of the Iranian plan and not due to complete lack of ability, the obvious answer is that Iran does not want to escalate to the point that the USA enters the war. Similarly, much of the debate in the first few episodes of The Wargame is over how exactly to respond to Russian aggression, and whether any British actions would complicate attempts to draw upon allied (especially American) support in the age of ‘America First’ foreign policy. Especially in the nuclear age, the narrative around tactical activity is often as important as the activity itself.
I’m not sure which direction the Israel-Iran conflict will take, but I am not at all optimistic that it will lead to any sense of lasting peace in the region, regardless of how far Israel manages to achieve its objectives. I am, however, very certain that the depressing, never-ending cycle of tragedy and violence which afflicts the Middle East will not disappear any time soon. As someone who knows and loves the region, it is a continually depressing truth that general peace in the Middle East seems forever out of reach.
Nevertheless, for now, the new escalation in hostilities provides useful context for studying and understanding elements of modern warfare, not least as a comparison to that seen in Ukraine. Once again, through watching these conflicts, and through simulations like The Wargame, it is brutally apparent that the UK is not ready for the rigours of conventional warfare. If we are to avoid another tragedy like that unfolding now in the Middle East or Ukraine, we should prepare ourselves better for a potential conflict - especially one that might erupt closer to our shores than we currently imagine.
I hope you found the above useful. Let me know what you think below.
All the best,
Matthew
Nations that rely heavily on air power are probably especially guilty of this - I admit, I am unconvinced that air power alone can win wars without significant ground commitment.
You can probably count on one hand the number of countries that are truly prepared for 21st century conventional war.
I think another thing The Wargame and this conflict shows is that defence strategy that depends heavily on a partner intervening (Iran Aligned Militas for Iran, the US for the UK) is very exposed to sudden shifts in those partner's policies/capabilities. A partner's disposition can change within a year, your organic defence capabilities cannot.